

Supreme Court No. 93830-0
(Court of Appeals No. 47136-1-II)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

DALE HARVEY OYA, III,

Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER AND OPINION BELOW1

B. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW1

C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE2

D. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED7

 1. **Review should be granted to clarify what constitutes the crime of hit and run and to reverse Mr. Oya’s conviction which is not supported by sufficient evidence**.....7

 2. **Review should be granted because joinder of unrelated offenses deprived Mr. Oya of his constitutional right to a fair trial**.....10

 3. **Review should be granted because Mr. Oya’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the trial court admitted a non-testifying declarant’s hearsay accusation against him**18

E. CONCLUSION.....23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Washington Supreme Court Decisions

<u>In re Davis</u> , 152 Wn.2d 647, 101 P.3d 1 (2004).....	12, 18
<u>State v. Brown</u> , 113 Wn.2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989).....	14
<u>State v. Bruton</u> , 66 Wn.2d 111, 401 P.2d 340 (1965).....	16
<u>State v. Delmarter</u> , 94 Wn.2d 634, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).....	7
<u>State v. Guloy</u> , 104 Wn.2d 411, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985).....	20
<u>State v. Jones</u> , 101 Wn.2d 113, 677 P.2d 131 (1984).....	14
<u>State v. Kalakosky</u> , 121 Wn.2d 525, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993).....	11
<u>State v. Kelly</u> , 102 Wn.2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984).....	14
<u>State v. Nichols</u> , 161 Wn.2d 1, 162 P.3d 1122 (2007)	15, 22
<u>State v. Rohrich</u> , 149 Wn.2d 647, 71 P.3d 638 (2003).....	12
<u>State v. Salinas</u> , 119 Wn.2d 192, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)	7
<u>State v. Stephens</u> , 93 Wn.2d 186, 607 P.2d 304 (1980)	20
<u>State v. Thomas</u> , 109 Wn.2d 222, 743 P.2d 816 (1987).....	22

Washington Court of Appeals Decisions

<u>City of Spokane v. Carlson</u> , 96 Wn. App. 279, 979 P.2d 880 (1999).....	10
<u>State v. Bryant</u> , 89 Wn.App. 857, 950 P.2d 1004 (1998).....	10, 17
<u>State v. Harris</u> , 36 Wn. App. 746, 677 P.2d 202 (1984).....	13
<u>State v. Lough</u> , 70 Wn. App. 302, 853 P.2d 920 (1993).....	15
<u>State v. Nichols</u> , 5 Wn.App. 657, 491 P.2d 677 (1971).....	15
<u>State v. Price</u> , 126 Wn. App. 617, 109 P.3d 27, 41 (2005).....	16
<u>State v. Ramirez</u> , 46 Wn. App. 223, 730 P.3d 98 (1986)	14
<u>State v. Ramirez</u> , 46 Wn.App. 223, 730 P.2d 98 (1986)	11, 17
<u>State v. Saunders</u> , 91 Wn. App. 575, 958 P.2d 364 (1998)	23
<u>State v. Teuber</u> , 19 Wn. App. 651, 577 P.2d 147, <u>review denied</u> , 91 Wn.2d 1006 (1978).....	9, 10
<u>State v. Watkins</u> , 53 Wn.App. 264, 766 P.2d 484 (1989).....	11, 12, 17

United States Supreme Court Decisions

<u>Apprendi v. New Jersey</u> , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).....	7
<u>Chapman v. California</u> , 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967).....	20
<u>Crawford v. Washington</u> , 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).....	18, 19, 20, 23
<u>Davis v. Alaska</u> , 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974).....	19
<u>In re Winship</u> , 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970).....	7
<u>Jackson v. Virginia</u> , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)	

<u>Pointer v. Texas</u> , 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965).....	19
<u>Strickland v. Washington</u> , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).....	22
Washington Constitutional Provisions	
Article I, section 22.....	10
Article I, section 3.....	10
Federal Constitutional Provisions	
Fourteenth Amendment	7, 10
Rules	
CrR 4.4.....	10, 11, 12

A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER AND OPINION BELOW

Pursuant to RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2), (3), and (4) Dale Oya asks this Court to accept review of the October 11, 2016 opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Oya, 47136-1-II, the decision terminating review designated in Part B of this petition. (Copy attached as Appendix A.)

B. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Due process requires that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the State charged Mr. Oya with “hit and run,” naming the mother of his child as the complainant.

High on drugs, she stepped in front of the family van and was knocked to the ground. Mr. Oya stayed put and offered her aid. She refused again and again, so he left peacefully. In closing, the prosecutor admitted: “[H]e stopped, right. He came back around.” 5RP 476. The complainant, in whose name the vehicle was registered, obviously knows Mr. Oya. Should review be granted to clarify Mr. Oya did not violate the “hit and run” statute?

2. “Joinder of counts should never be used in such a way as to unduly embarrass or prejudice a defendant or deny [the defendant] a substantial right.” State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 62, 882 P.2d 747 (1994). Mr. Oya wanted to remain silent with respect to the hit and run (also alleged to be an intentional assault), but he wanted to testify in his

own defense with respect to an alleged attempted eluding said to occur three days later. The evidence was uneven in strength (he was acquitted of assault) and not cross-admissible, but Mr. Oya's motion to sever was denied. Should review be granted to reverse for a new and fair trial?

3. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant has the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers. Here, the trial court admitted a non-testifying witness's claim that Mr. Oya was purposefully evading the police. Even though defense counsel only lodged a hearsay objection, should review be granted to correct the Sixth Amendment error?

C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mr. Oya defended against three felonies: assault in the second degree (Count I), failure to remain at injury accident (Count II), and attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle (Count III). CP 1-2. Counts I and II were alleged to be crimes of "domestic violence" committed against Angel Boyd on February 4, 2014, while Count III was alleged to have occurred on February 7, 2014. CP 1-2.

The trial court denied a defense motion to sever, even when renewed. 1RP 10¹, 2RP 33-58, 3RP 299, 4RP 447-49; CP 9-15.

¹ The verbatim report of the trial is referred to by the volume number provided by the court reporter. (Unused volumes omitted.)

Complainant Angel Boyd (who has a child with Mr. Oya) testified the couple drove around in the family car: “our minivan, Town and Country minivan,” and ended up at a gas station. 3RP 199, 201. They had been at a casino, but Ms. Boyd later left on her own to look for drugs, which upset Mr. Oya. 3RP 218, 220-23.

Ms. Boyd used “a lot” of methamphetamine and “quite a bit” of heroin that night. 3RP 203. Mr. Oya did not know she “was getting high” and did not want her “out running around doing drugs.” 3RP 225. Mr. Oya wanted her to stop, but Ms. Boyd “wanted to go and get high” again. 3RP 203-04, 206. She was “very high” and really mad. 3RP 208, 231.

Mr. Oya asked her to get back in the minivan, but she refused. 3RP 232-234. She got in the car’s way: “I was blocking him the other way... I ran out and blocked him. Before I knew it, I was on the floor. That’s all I remember.” 3RP 207. This accident was her fault: “I stepped in front of the vehicle when he was trying to go.” 3RP 207. She testified she did not think that Mr. Oya intended to hit her. 3RP 208, 236, 240. (The jury acquitted of assault. CP 74.)

2RP = November 12, 2014 (marked Vol. 2)
3RP = November 13, 2014 (marked Vol. 3)
4RP = November 18, 2014 (marked Vol. 4)
5RP = November 19, 2014 (marked Vol. 5)
8RP = January 9, 2015 (marked Vol. 8)

After she fell, Mr. Oya was still there, again asking that she come with him. 3RP 208, 239. Looking back on what happened, Ms. Boyd wished she had accepted his offer. 3RP 241. She was too high to respond appropriately: “I was really high. I don’t know. I just felt stuck.” 3RP 208. She told Mr. Oya “get the hell out of here... leave,” just “kept cussing at him and telling him to go... go, the cops are coming... Go, get out of here... he left.” 3RP 209.

Two civilian witnesses confirmed that the minivan circled back to Ms. Boyd and stopped. 4RP 357-358, 370. The minivan left calmly. 4RP 361, 365, 378-379. The prosecutor conceded this in closing argument: “[H]e stopped, right. He came back around.” 5RP 476.

Ms. Boyd “had warrants and [] didn’t want to deal with the police.” 3RP 209. She was scared, she was “under the influence, and I probably even had drugs on me.” 3RP 215. She told the police she “had nothing to say to them” and avoided talking to them because she was “high.” 3RP 210, 215. She did not recall speaking with medical staff and testified that she did not need aid because she was not injured.² 3RP 212, 213, 232, 236.

² Some witnesses described seeing Ms. Boyd limping, possibly having swelling on her leg, or walking with one shoe on and the other off. 3RP 253-54, 4RP 380, 396.

Ms. Boyd had no need for Mr. Oya to give her his address or license information because she knew him and where to find him. 3RP 233-34. Computer records relied on by the police listed her as the vehicle's registered owner so the police reported her as the minivan's owner. 3RP 283.³

A responding police officer testified about what Ms. Boyd told him that night. This included an out-of-court claim that Ms. Boyd had argued with Mr. Oya about infidelity, but not her drug use, and that she had to roll out of the minivan's way. 3RP 254-56, 258, 278-79. Ms. Boyd declined to give a written statement or sworn statement and she declined medical aid. 3RP 256, 271; 4RP 395-96.

Three days later, police pursued the minivan after it took off in response to their sirens. 3RP 305-07, 311-13, 315. A little later the minivan came to an abrupt stop and a passenger jumped out. 3RP 316, 337. Officer Waddell testified the minivan was not speeding. 4RP 409-10, 424, 440. The driver was "following the traffic laws" and the officer "didn't observe any direct traffic violations." 4RP 424.⁴

³ However, Ms. Boyd testified she did not know the license plate number, who the minivan was actually registered to, and that while the couple referred to the minivan as "ours" it was actually "his." 3RP 233, 237.

⁴ Officer Waddell chased and detained the passenger. 4RP 410-12. Defense counsel lodged only a hearsay objection – not a Sixth Amendment right to confront objection – when the prosecutor asked Officer Waddell to tell the jury what the passenger said to him. 4RP 412. The officer testified that the passenger, Jordan George, said the

After the passenger left, the vehicle started moving again and a second pursuit occurred. 3RP 316-339. The driver maintained full control over the vehicle, did not collide with anyone or anything, and slowed down for turns, but reached an estimated top speed of 70 or 75 miles an hour. 3RP 316, 330, 332. Not much later, the minivan pulled over safely and Mr. Oya was arrested. 3RP 317, 319, 331, 335, 339.

The State argued the passenger was endangered. 5RP 484. The State asked the jury to rely on the passenger's out-of-court hearsay to convict Mr. Oya of eluding and the special verdict. 5RP 483-85; 540-41.

Mr. Oya was acquitted of assault but convicted of hit and run (injury) and attempting to elude. CP 74-77. The jury also found the special verdict of endangerment applied. CP 80.

The trial judge "seriously" considered a Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative but defense counsel failed to deliver the necessary screening report. 8RP 581-83.

For the "hit and run," Mr. Oya was sent to serve five years in prison. CP 85-93.

minivan's driver, Mr. Oya, "knew that the police were behind him... that [Mr. Oya] knew that he was going to get stopped," 4RP 412. Mr. George was released and he did not testify at Mr. Oya's trial. 4RP 438.

D. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED

1. **Review should be granted to clarify what constitutes the crime of hit and run and to reverse Mr. Oya's conviction which is not supported by sufficient evidence.**

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires the State prove each essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). Evidence is sufficient only if, reviewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).

A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).

Review should be granted because what Mr. Oya did was not a violation of the hit and run statute. For one, he stayed on the scene. Furthermore, his preexisting relationship with Ms. Boyd (and the fact that she was the registered owner) obviated the need for him to exchange information with her.

The “to convict” instruction given for Count II required the State to prove that Mr. Oya was knowingly involved in an injury-causing motor vehicle accident in Washington State, and:

failed to satisfy his obligation to fulfill all of the following duties:

(a) Immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible.

(b) Immediately return to and remain at the scene of the accident until all duties are fulfilled.

(c) Give his name, address, insurance company, insurance police [sic] number and vehicle license number and exhibit his driver’s license to any person struck or injured, and

(d) Render to any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance...

Instruction No. 14, CP 61 (emphasis added).

By this grammatical structure and the use of the conjunctive “and,” the State was obligated to prove that Mr. Oya failed to discharge “all” four duties. State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97, 99, 954 P.2d 900 (1998). The State did not meet that burden because Mr. Oya most certainly stopped his vehicle at the scene of the accident.⁵

In fact, in closing argument, the prosecutor outlined how Mr. Oya stopped as required and that the State’s proof in this regard was lacking:

⁵ The charging document used a disjunctive grammatical structure, alleging that Mr. Oya committed a hit and run because he: “did fail to immediately stop and/or return to and/or remain at the scene of that accident.” CP 2 (emphasis added).

We also have testimony from the 9-1-1 callers that the minivan strikes her and then comes back around and talks to her, right.

...

He came back around the gas pump and stopped by Ms. Boyd, okay. You heard the testimony from Connie Sharp that she also saw the minivan come back, right.

5RP 473-75 (emphasis added).

Well, theoretically, he stopped, right. He came back around, and he stopped by Ms. Boyd when they have this altercation. Theoretically, he did stop right after the accident.

5RP 475-76.

As the jury was instructed, the State bore the burden of proving that Mr. Oya: 1) did not stop and, 2) did not remain, and, 3) did not exchange information, and, 4) did not render reasonable assistance. Instruction No. 14, CP 61. The hit and run conviction cannot stand.

Separately, the conviction cannot stand because Ms. Boyd was the registered owner, knew Mr. Oya and how to find him, and she voluntarily directed him to leave the scene. 3RP 283, 3RP 233-34, 3RP 209.

Review should be granted because the Opinion directly conflicts with State v. Teuber, 19 Wn. App. 651, 577 P.2d 147, review denied, 91 Wn.2d 1006 (1978). In Teuber, the drivers involved were next door neighbors and each knew the other's address. The occupants of the damaged vehicle left the scene. Id. at 657. In so doing, they "obviated the requirement that Teuber exhibit his vehicle operator's license" and the

conviction was reversed for insufficient evidence. Id. Accord City of Spokane v. Carlson, 96 Wn. App. 279, 287, 979 P.2d 880 (1999) (distinguishing Teuber because the involved parties “did not have a relationship in which either could locate the other to exchange information.”)

Here, Ms. Boyd did not leave, but she did direct Mr. Oya to, even as he was asking that she come with him. 3RP 208-09, 239, 241. And, just as the fact that the Teuber parties knew each other well rendered the requirement of exchanging information useless, the same holds true for Mr. Oya and Ms. Boyd.

Review should be granted to clarify what constitutes the crime of hit and run and to reverse Mr. Oya’s conviction which is not supported by sufficient evidence.

2. Review should be granted because joinder of unrelated offenses deprived Mr. Oya of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

The rules governing severance are based on the fundamental concern that an accused person receive “a fair trial untainted by undue prejudice.” State v. Bryant, 89 Wn. App. 857, 865, 950 P.2d 1004 (1998); U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Wash. Const. Art. I, §§ 3, 22; CrR 4.4(b). Severance of offenses “shall” be granted whenever “severance will promote a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each

offense.” CrR 4.4(b). Joinder of offenses is deemed “inherently prejudicial” and, “[i]f the defendant can demonstrate substantial prejudice, the trial court’s failure to sever is an abuse of discretion.” State v. Ramirez, 46 Wn. App. 223, 226, 730 P.2d 98 (1986). Courts weigh the inherent prejudice of joinder against the State’s interest in maximizing judicial economy. State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 537, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993).

Prejudice from joinder will result if a single trial invites the jury to cumulate evidence to find guilt or otherwise infer a criminal disposition. State v. Watkins, 53 Wn. App. 264, 268, 766 P.2d 484 (1989). Prejudice may occur when the accused is embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate defenses. Id.

Four “prejudice-mitigating” factors guide whether the potential for prejudice calls for severance: 1) the strength of the State’s evidence on each count; 2) the clarity of defenses as to each count; 3) the court’s instructions to consider each count separately; and 4) the admissibility of evidence of other charges even if not joined for trial. State v. Smith, 74 Wn.2d 744, 446 P.2d 571 (1968); State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 63, 882 P.2d 747 (1994).

A trial court severance ruling is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and a trial court abuses its discretion when its decision “is manifestly unreasonable, or is exercised on untenable grounds, or for

untenable reasons.” State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 653, 71 P.3d 638 (2003). Fundamentally, the exercise of the trial court’s discretion regarding severance rests on an evaluation of whether severance promotes a fair determination of guilt or innocence. In re Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 711, 101 P.3d 1 (2004); CrR 4.4(b).

Here, the State’s case was weak across the board. In fact, the jury rejected the assault charge, but the inclusion of the sensational nature of that accusation prejudiced the jury against Mr. Oya on the other counts. As described above, Mr. Oya’s departure from the gas station was legally insufficient to establish he committed a crime. The eluding charge also lacked a solid evidentiary foundation. Mixing the charges together was error because severance is warranted where the strength of one count bolsters a weaker count. Russell, 125 Wn.2d at 63-64.

A defendant’s desire to testify on one count but not on another count requires severance where the defendant has important testimony to give on the one count and a strong need to remain silent on the other count. Russell, 125 Wn.2d at 65, citing Watkins, 53 Wn. App. at 270. That was the case here.

Mr. Oya wanted to present evidence in his own behalf regarding Count III⁶, but he did not want to give up his right to remain silent to present his defense as to Counts I and II. 2RP 45. He renewed this motion at least twice, emphasizing his need to testify to respond to the endangerment allegation on Count III. 3RP 299, 4RP 447-50.

Mr. Oya wanted to explain why he failed to obey the police order to stop, and how he had not been reckless in his driving, but could not do it because Counts I and II remained joined. 2RP 47; CP 13-14. He had a strong incentive to take the stand, because the police officers' testimony about the quality of his driving was subjective and uncorroborated. The denial of the severance also resulted in Mr. Oya being able to testify that his passenger was never endangered.

The jury was properly instructed to consider the counts separately. CP 50. However, instructions are not always sufficient to mitigate against prejudice from joined counts. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 36 Wn. App. 746, 750, 677 P.2d 202 (1984). Here, the instructions could not overcome the improper bolstering resulting from joinder. And the instructions had no impact on his forced choice not to testify.

⁶ Defense counsel made the following offer of proof that Mr. Oya would testify: "he wasn't intending to get away from the cops. He wasn't driving recklessly. He was trying to get to a house where he thought he could park his van so it wouldn't get impounded by the police... My client is going to testify that he didn't feel that he was driving recklessly. He didn't put people in danger... For Mr. Oya to get up there and offer an alternative to what they [the police] are saying, I think it is important." 2RP 47.

Alarming, the instruction contains no admonishment that evidence from one count cannot be used in determining the verdict on the other count, or that the jurors should not presume Mr. Oya to be a law breaker because he is accused of committing multiple crimes over multiple days. CP 50. The introduction of multiple counts into one proceeding is not all that different than presenting information about a past offense and "[s]tatistical studies have shown that even with limiting instructions, a jury is more likely to convict a defendant with a criminal record." State v. Jones, 101 Wn.2d 113, 120, 677 P.2d 131 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 113 Wn.2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989).

Traditionally the State may not introduce evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts, because "such evidence has a great capacity to arouse prejudice." State v. Kelly, 102 Wn.2d 188, 199, 685 P.2d 564 (1984). With respect to cross-admissibility and severance, the question is whether the evidence of various offenses would be admissible to prove the other charges if each offense was tried separately. State v. Ramirez, 46 Wn. App. 223, 226, 730 P.3d 98 (1986); ER 404(b). "In cases where admissibility is a close call, the scale should be tipped in favor of the defendant and exclusion of the evidence." State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870, 887, 204 P.3d 916 (2009) (internal citations omitted).

In determining whether evidence is admissible under ER 404(b), courts must “(1) identify the purpose for which the evidence is to be admitted; (2) determine that the evidence is relevant and of consequence to the outcome; and (3) balance the probative value of the evidence against its potential prejudicial effect.” State v. Lough, 70 Wn. App. 302, 313, 853 P.2d 920 (1993).

The trial court saw the attempted eluding as evidence of flight, and therefore guilt, with respect to the assault in the second degree and hit and run charge. RP 54. This was error. “Analytically, flight is an admission by conduct. Evidence of flight is admissible if it creates ‘a reasonable and substantive inference that defendant’s departure from the scene was an instinctive or impulsive reaction to a consciousness of guilt or was a deliberate effort to evade arrest and prosecution.’” State v. Freeburg, 105 Wn. App. 492, 497, 20 P.3d 984 (2001) (footnote omitted), quoting State v. Nichols, 5 Wn. App. 657, 660, 491 P.2d 677 (1971).

When evidence of flight is admissible, it tends to be only marginally probative to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. Freeburg, 105 Wn. App. at 498. “Therefore, while the range of circumstances that may be shown as evidence of flight is broad, the circumstance or inference of consciousness of guilt must be substantial and real, not speculative, conjectural, or fanciful.” The eluding was not evidence of flight or guilt.

The probative value of evidence of flight as circumstantial evidence of guilt depends on the degree of confidence with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from the defendant's behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged. *Id.* "The inference of flight must be "substantial and real" not "speculative, conjectural, or fanciful.'" State v. Price, 126 Wn. App. 617, 645, 109 P.3d 27, 41 (2005), quoting State v. Bruton, 66 Wn.2d 111, 112, 401 P.2d 340 (1965).

First, unlike defendants in Price or even Freeburg, Mr. Oya did not actually flee the jurisdiction. Three days after the alleged "hit and run," he was still in Washington, still in Pierce County, still driving the same minivan on the public streets of Tacoma. And, as Ms. Boyd testified, he left the gas station because she told him to. 3RP 209. This is not flight.

The inference that he failed to obey a police directive to stop three days later is speculative, not substantial or real.⁷ Freeburg, at 498.

⁷ Defense counsel correctly argued in pretrial motions that if the eluding had occurred "immediately on leaving the [accident] scene," then the inference of consciousness of guilt would have been clearer. 2RP 42. The trial court did not expressly determine if the inference of flight was substantial and real. The judge just broadly described the two incidents as "connected together... related because the action on that date tends to show what his intent was on the prior date, at least the State's account of this does. That may not be true, but that's for the jury to decide." 2RP 57-58.

Moreover, Mr. Oya's defense counsel made an offer of proof that Mr. Oya failed to stop when directed to by the police for a different reason altogether: he was not insured and did not have a driver's license. 2RP 42.

In finding that the eluding evidence was not substantially more prejudicial than probative, the trial court erred again. 2RP 57-58. If, like in Freeburg, a felon's criminal possession of a firearm is not categorically admissible as evidence of flight, this Court should similarly clarify there is no categorical link between an attempted eluding charge and an ambiguous incident that occurred days earlier.⁸

The joint trial of these separate offenses created an improper impression that Mr. Oya has a "general propensity" toward criminal acts. Ramirez, 46 Wn. App. at 227; see also Watkins, 53 Wn. App. at 272. The attempted eluding evidence was particularly prejudicial because it suggested Mr. Oya uses motor vehicles to hurt, or nearly hurt, others.

Two separate trials would not have strained judicial resources, but the failure to sever did deprive Mr. Oya of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial. Review should be granted and reversal ordered. Bryant, 89 Wn. App. at 864; Ramirez, 46 Wn. App. at 228.

⁸ Freeburg made a statement suggesting that his gun possession was part of intentional flight, but that statement was excluded and thus could not be used to connect the dots. Freeburg, at 501. Likewise, the State cannot rely on the wrongly admitted statement of the passenger, suggesting that Mr. Oya expected to be arrested, as evidence that the attempted eluding was flight indicative of consciousness of guilt.

3. Review should be granted because Mr. Oya's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the trial court admitted a non-testifying declarant's hearsay accusation against him.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Admission of testimonial statements denies the defendant the opportunity to test accusers' statements "in the crucible of cross examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).

The admission of testimonial statements of a witness who does not appear at a criminal trial violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment unless (1) the witness is unavailable to testify, and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. An out of court statement is testimonial if the primary purpose is to establish or prove past events relevant to later criminal prosecution. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006).

Statements that were made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial are testimonial. Id. at 52. Generally,

“[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are [] testimonial.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.

What the passenger said in response to Officer Weddell’s questioning was testimonial, because he said it while in custody. 4RP 409-11 (officer questioning passenger in “wrist restraints.”); 4RP 437-38 (police detention extended to find out if the passenger had warrants). Under the circumstances, Mr. Oya had a constitutional right to cross-examine the passenger, a right he was unable to exercise because the State did not produce him as a witness for trial.

“Cross examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974). “The fact that this right appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights reflects the belief of the Framers of those liberties and safeguards that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.” Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. U.S. 400, 404, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965).

The Sixth Amendment error deprived Mr. Oya of a fair trial. Officer Waddell told the jury that the passenger said that Mr. Oya “knew that the police were behind him” and that Mr. Oya “knew that he was going to get stopped.” 4RP 412.

Mr. Oya had a constitutional right to confront and cross examine the declarant of this testimonial statement, which was made for the purpose of establishing and proving a past and specific fact: that Mr. Oya knew he was eluding and that he had a guilty mind, presumably about the incident with Ms. Boyd from three days earlier. RP 412. Neither the jury nor Mr. Oya had no opportunity to assess the reliability of this evidence by testing it “in the crucible of cross-examination.” See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60. Because the evidence was testimonial and Mr. Oya had no opportunity to cross examine the witness about these assertions, its admission violated the Sixth Amendment.

Constitutional error is presumed to be prejudicial and the State bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967); State v. Stephens, 93 Wn.2d 186, 190-91, 607 P.2d 304 (1980). “A constitutional error is harmless if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same result in the absence of the error.” State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 411, 425, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985). A conviction must be reversed “where there is any reasonable possibility that the use of inadmissible evidence was necessary to reach a guilty verdict.” Id.

The passenger's statement introduced against Mr. Oya was deeply prejudicial. First, when the officer reported that the passenger told him "basically, [Mr. Oya] knew that the police were behind him," it was to show that Mr. Oya was knowingly eluding the officers. 4RP 412. The second part of that utterance where the passenger alleged that Mr. Oya "knew that he was going to get stopped" was to prove that Mr. Oya had a guilty state of mind. 4RP 412. With the joinder of all three counts, the implication was that he was acknowledging having done something illegal at the time of the gas station accident.

The prosecutor argued that what the officer said the passenger said proved that Mr. Oya had a guilty mind because he

knew that he was going to get stopped. He told the passenger that. He said, we are going to get stopped. I'm going to get pulled over. The passenger told Officer Waddell that. The defendant knew. The defendant knew that the police were after him. Of course, he does. Again, we know from earlier, he injured his girlfriend, left her at the gas station. So, the defendant's actions were knowingly.

5RP 485 (emphases added). The prosecutor revisited this evidence in rebuttal. 5RP 540 ("[H]e knows that he is going to get pulled over. He tells his passenger that.") The prosecutor also argued that the passenger was endangered because of what the police said the passenger said. 5RP 483-84. "His actions have endangered that passenger who stated that he wanted nothing to do with this." 5RP 485. (emphasis added.)

The State cannot prove that this violation of Mr. Oya's confrontation rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court should grant review, reverse and remand both convictions for a new trial.

Notably, this Court should reach the underlying constitutional error even though defense counsel failed to lodge a specific Sixth Amendment objection. Denial of a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is an error of constitutional magnitude. State v. Nichols, 161 Wn.2d 1, 9, 162 P.3d 1122 (2007). To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make two showings: (1) defense counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances; and (2) defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225–26, 743 P.2d 816 (1987) (applying the two-prong test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). U.S. Const. Amend. VI.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to object, the defendant must show: (1) the absence of a legitimate strategic or tactical reason for not objecting; (2) that the trial court would have sustained the objection if made; and (3) the result of the

trial would have differed if the evidence had not been admitted. State v. Saunders, 91 Wn. App. 575, 578, 958 P.2d 364 (1998).

Defense counsel was appropriately trying to prohibit the State from using the statement, but hearsay was an insufficient objection. 4RP 412. The proper objection would have relied on the Sixth Amendment right to confront. Under Crawford, the trial court would have sustained that objection. The prejudice to Mr. Oya is plain. Because Mr. Oya received ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court should reach the underlying constitutional Sixth Amendment error.

E. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set out above, Mr. Oya respectfully requests that his petition for review be granted.

DATED this 10th day of November 2016.

Respectfully submitted,

/s Mick Woynarowski

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October 11, 2016

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

DALE HARVEY OYA III,

Appellant.

No. 47136-1-II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

JOHANSON, J. — A jury acquitted Dale Harvey Oya III of one count of second degree assault but found him guilty of one count of failing to remain at an injury accident (hit and run) and one count of attempting to elude pursuing police (eluding) with a sentence enhancement for endangering another person. Oya appeals his conviction and sentence enhancement. We hold that (1) there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions and the enhancement, (2) any confrontation clause violation was harmless, (3) counsel was not ineffective, and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Oya's motion to sever. We affirm Oya's convictions and sentence.

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

On February 4, 2014, Oya stopped at a gas station with his girlfriend, Angel Boyd, and her friend.¹ Boyd and Oya argued and continued to do so after Boyd and her friend stepped out of the van at the gas station. Boyd stood near the van when Oya drove it forward, hit her on the side of her body, and knocked her to the ground. Oya drove away, turned around, and drove back to Boyd, stopped, and asked Boyd to get back in the van to come with him. Boyd refused and told Oya to leave. Oya left. Boyd's leg was injured. There were several witnesses to this event. Police were unable to locate the van or Oya that evening.

On February 7, Officer Douglas Walsh and Officer Travis Waddell saw the van while on patrol. The officers attempted to initiate a traffic stop. After initially stopping, the van drove off. Both officers followed the van with their lights and sirens on. The van either slowed or stopped, and the passenger, Jordan George, jumped out. Officer Walsh continued to pursue the van, which accelerated to 70 to 75 MPH, then slowed to 15 to 20 MPH before it stopped. Oya exited the van and was arrested.

II. PROCEDURAL FACTS AND MOTION TO SEVER

The State charged Oya with second degree assault, hit and run, and eluding. The eluding charge also alleged a sentencing enhancement that Oya endangered one or more persons.

Before trial, Oya moved to sever the eluding charge from the other two counts. Defense counsel made several arguments in favor of severance.

¹ Boyd testified that her friend "Arlene" was with them that day and witnessed the events. Arlene did not testify.

Oya made an offer of proof that he would testify that (1) he did not intend to get away from the police, (2) he intended to park his van so it would not get impounded because he was driving without a license, (3) he did not feel he was driving recklessly, and (4) he did not put people in danger. The trial court stated that it could not conclude that admitting evidence about the eluding in a joined trial with the assault and hit and run charges was more prejudicial than probative. The trial court added that the charges were all related because “the action on that date tends to show what his intent was on the prior date” if the State’s version of the case proved to be true. 2 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 57.² The trial court concluded that that question was for the jury to decide and denied the motion to sever.

Later, Oya renewed his motion to sever the eluding charge from the assault and the hit and run charges. Oya made the same arguments as before but added that his testimony was the only way to challenge the sentencing enhancement. He did not make an offer of proof as to what facts he would testify to about the risk of harm to George. The trial court noted that Oya could testify, but if he wished to testify about his intent during eluding, that may implicate the assault and hit and run charges, in which case Oya would have to run the risk of cross-examination about those charges, but that that is the “choice every defendant has.” 4 RP at 449. The trial court concluded that Oya’s desire to testify about one count was not a proper basis to sever and denied the motion.

III. TRIAL

Trial began November 13 and testimony lasted two days. Eight witnesses testified for the State. Boyd testified that she and Oya lived together, have a child together, and share the van. She

² There is no written order denying the motion to sever in our record.

testified that she and Oya argued in the van because she was using methamphetamine and heroin that day. Boyd found herself on the ground at the gas station, but did not remember how she got there. Oya was crying, told her to get back in the van, and offered to help her get in though Boyd could not remember how he offered. She testified that she was high, not injured, but told Boyd that she could not get up to get in the van. Boyd heard people talking on phones and she told Oya to leave because the police were coming. Oya left.

Officers Jimmy Welsh and Daniel Bortle testified about what they saw when they arrived at the gas station. Officer Welsh testified that when he arrived, Boyd was sitting on the ground, crying, holding her leg in pain. He observed swelling on her knee and ankle. Boyd told Welsh that she was walking towards the gas station when the van revved up and hit her when she turned around. Boyd is the registered owner of the van. Officer Bortle testified that when he arrived, Boyd held her leg and said it hurt. Officer Bortle also observed swelling on her ankle.

Gabriella Lopez testified that while driving across the street from the gas station, she saw Oya and Boyd arguing. Lopez saw Boyd fall to the ground and get hit by the van.³ At the gas station, Lopez found Boyd on the ground, sobbing.⁴ Lacey Sharp testified that she saw Oya and Boyd arguing from across the street from the gas station. The van pulled forward as if to go around Boyd, and Lacey Sharp did not see the van contact Boyd, but saw Boyd on the ground crying after

³ Lopez further testified that she saw the van run over Boyd's legs with two tires, back up, and run over her legs again and then run over her entire body with all four wheels. This testimony was not consistent with the testimony of any other witness's report of events or report of the severity of Boyd's injuries.

⁴ At the conclusion of Lopez's testimony and before Officer Walsh testified, Oya renewed his previously denied motion to sever the assault and the hit and run from the eluding without making additional argument. The trial court denied the motion.

No. 47136-1-II

the van moved. Connie Sharp, Lacey Sharp's mother, saw Oya return to Boyd, who was on the ground, stop the van, and speak to Boyd from the van for a couple of minutes before Oya left. Boyd was helped up from the ground by her friend Arlene and limped to the gas station store. Police were unable to locate Oya that evening.

On February 7, while on patrol, Officer Walsh saw the van. Officers Walsh and Waddell followed Oya in the van with their emergency lights on. The van stopped and Officer Waddell told Oya to exit his van. Oya took off; Officer Walsh pursued the van with his lights and sirens on. According to Officer Walsh, Oya made an "abrupt" stop and George jumped out. 3 RP at 329. Oya turned on to Portland Avenue at an estimated 30 to 40 MPH, then accelerated to 70 to 75 MPH, then slowed again to 15 to 20 MPH before stopping. There were no near collisions with persons or property and Oya did not make any u-turns or sudden bolts down alleys to avoid the police. There was "[l]ight to medium" traffic throughout the pursuit. 3 RP at 318. There were a few spots of ice on the road, but it was otherwise dry. The entire pursuit lasted between half a mile to three-quarters of a mile.

Officer Waddell testified similarly to Officer Walsh, but added that the first time Oya stopped, it was in the middle of a one-way road. Officer Waddell exited his car and drew his gun to a "low ready" position and pointed it off to his side at the ground. 4 RP at 426. Oya looked back at the police officers and then drove off again. Officer Waddell was directly behind Oya, and Officer Walsh was behind Officer Waddell. According to Officer Waddell, Oya did not stop, but was driving 15 to 20 MPH when George leaped out. George tried to land on his feet, but was going too fast, so he rolled on the ground. Officer Waddell placed George in wrist restraints. Officer Waddell testified that George was "very flustered, excited, and seemed stressed." 4 RP at 411.

The State then asked Officer Waddell what George said. Oya objected on the basis of hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection because the State established that George was excited when he spoke. George said that “[Oya], basically, knew that the police were behind him because he said something to the effect that he knew that he was going to get stopped.” 4 RP at 412. The State asked if George gave a reason why he jumped from the car, and Officer Waddell replied, “He jumped from the car because he didn’t want to be involved. He didn’t realize that Mr. Oya was wanted by police or anything like that.” 4 RP at 412. The State rested after Officer Waddell’s testimony. No defense witnesses testified, and the defense rested.

IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CLOSING ARGUMENT, AND VERDICT

The trial court gave an instruction on the lesser-included offense of failure to obey a police officer in case the jury found Oya’s driving was not reckless. The trial court also instructed the jury that “[a] separate crime is charged in each count. You must decide each count separately. Your verdict on one count should not control your verdict on any other count.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 50. Jury instruction 14 states in relevant part,

To convict the defendant of hit and run, *each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:*

....
(4) That the defendant *failed* to satisfy his obligation to fulfill *all* of the following duties:

(a) *Immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible.*

(b) Immediately return to and remain at the scene of the accident until all duties are fulfilled.

(c) Give his name, address, insurance company, insurance police [sic] number and vehicle license number and exhibit his driver’s license to any person struck or injured, and

(d) Render to any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying or making of arrangements for the carrying of such person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment

is necessary or such carrying is requested by the injured person or on his or her behalf.

CP at 61 (emphasis added).

During closing argument, the State argued regarding the eluding charge and the special verdict that “[t]he person who is endangered here is the passenger.” 5 RP at 484. The State also argued that Oya knowingly attempted to elude police because he knew “from earlier” that he had “injured his girlfriend [and] left her at the gas station” and noted “he fled” on both days. 4 RP at 485-86.

The jury acquitted Oya of assault but found him guilty of hit and run and eluding. The jury also found that another person was threatened with physical injury or harm during the eluding. Oya received the maximum sentence of 60 months for the hit and run and 29 months for the eluding, plus 12 months and a day for the enhancement to run concurrently.

ANALYSIS

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Oya argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the hit and run conviction, the eluding conviction, and the enhancement that he endangered George during the eluding. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a claim of insufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and review whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. Homan*, 181 Wn.2d 102, 105, 330 P.3d 182 (2014). Thus, we admit the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom. *State v. Cannon*, 120 Wn. App. 86, 90, 84 P.3d 283 (2004). We do not review

No. 47136-1-II

credibility determinations which are left to the fact finder. *Homan*, 181 Wn.2d at 110. Circumstantial evidence is not considered any less reliable than direct evidence. *State v. Delmarter*, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).

B. HIT AND RUN

Oya makes two arguments that there was insufficient evidence to support his hit and run conviction.⁵ Oya's arguments fail.

The hit and run statute states,

(1) A driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the injury to or death of any person or involving striking the body of a deceased person *shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident* or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to, *and in every event remain at, the scene of such accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (3) of this section . . .*

. . . .

(3) Unless otherwise provided in subsection (7) of this section the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person, or involving striking the body of a deceased person, or resulting in damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person or damage to other property shall give his or her name, address, insurance company, insurance policy number, and vehicle license number and shall exhibit his or her vehicle driver's license to any person struck or injured or the driver or any occupant of, or any person attending, any such vehicle collided with *and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying or the making of arrangements for the carrying of such person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary.*

RCW 46.52.020 (emphasis added).

⁵ Oya also argues that his relationship with Boyd obviated the need for him to give her his contact and insurance information pursuant to *State v. Teuber*, 19 Wn. App. 651, 577 P.2d 147 (1978). The State concedes that Oya need not have offered Boyd his contact information pursuant to this case. In *Teuber*, the drivers involved in a hit and run were neighbors who knew each other, which the court found obviated the need for the drivers to exchange contact information. 19 Wn. App. at 657. Here, Boyd was Oya's girlfriend, they lived and have a child together, and they shared the van registered in Boyd's name. Thus, we accept the State's concession.

The hit and run “to convict” instruction stated in part,

(4) That the defendant *failed* to satisfy his obligation to fulfill *all* of the following duties:

(a) *Immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible.*

(b) Immediately return to and remain at the scene of the accident until all duties are fulfilled.

(c) Give his name, address, insurance company, insurance police [sic] number and vehicle license number and exhibit his driver’s license to any person struck or injured, and

(d) Render to any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying or making of arrangements for the carrying of such person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or such carrying is requested by the injured person or on his or her behalf.

CP at 61. This instruction matches 11A *Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal* 97.02, at 362 (3d ed. 2008) (WPIC).⁶

I. LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY HERE

First, Oya relies on *State v. Hickman*, 135 Wn.2d 97, 954 P.2d 900 (1998), to argue that the to-convict instruction is the law of the case and that the to-convict instruction’s grammatical structure obligated the State to prove that Oya failed to stop at the scene of the accident and because he did stop, the State failed to meet its burden. But this argument is unpersuasive. *Hickman* sets out the law of the case doctrine and states that where any *additional* elements are added to the to-convict instructions and the State does not object, that additional element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 135 Wn.2d at 99. However, the to-convict instruction here is identical to 11A WPIC 97.02. And that WPIC follows the plain language of the hit and run statute, RCW 46.52.020. There were no additional elements added to the to-convict instruction here. *Hickman*

⁶ Washington has adopted pattern jury instructions to assist trial courts. *State v. Bennett*, 161 Wn.2d 303, 307, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007).

does not support Oya's contention that the to-convict instruction obligated the State to prove an additional element.

A plain reading of RCW 46.52.020 shows that it is the State's burden to show that a defendant failed to perform one or more of the required actions. Oya was required not only to stop, but to remain at the scene and render Boyd reasonable assistance, including getting her to or making arrangements to get her to a physician or hospital for medical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary. RCW 46.52.020(3). Although Oya stopped briefly, he left the scene and did not render aid. Thus, Oya's argument that the State presented insufficient evidence simply because the State failed to prove he did not stop, is unpersuasive.

2. OYA'S CLAIM THAT HE OFFERED AID

Second, Oya argues that he offered to render aid to Boyd, but Boyd told him to leave. This argument is also unpersuasive because RCW 46.52.020(3) requires the driver in a hit and run to do more than *offer* aid and provides no exceptions for an injured victim who declines aid.

Again, RCW 46.52.020(3) directs that the driver "shall render" reasonable assistance, including the carrying or the making of arrangements for the carrying of such person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary. And sufficient evidence supports that it was apparent that medical treatment was necessary where Boyd told Oya that she could not get up to get in the van to leave with him, she was limping when helped up, and the police officers testified that her leg was visibly swollen. Oya did not get out of the van to help Boyd or stay to render aid. And although Oya argues that he stopped to offer Boyd help, Boyd testified that she could not remember how he offered to help her get in the van, and the jury could have inferred that he made no such offer.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the hit and run charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

C. ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE POLICE PURSUIT

Oya argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he drove recklessly to support his conviction for attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. We disagree.

The attempting to elude statute states,

(1) Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to immediately bring his or her vehicle to a stop and who drives his or her vehicle in a *reckless manner* while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a class C felony.

RCW 46.61.024 (emphasis added).

Driving “in a reckless manner” means “driving in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.” *State v. Roggenkamp*, 153 Wn.2d 614, 622, 106 P.3d 196 (2005) (quoting *State v. Bowman*, 57 Wn.2d 266, 270, 271, 356 P.2d 999 (1960)). Exceeding the speed limit is prima facie evidence of reckless operation of a motor vehicle. RCW 46.61.465. But courts consider evidence in addition to speed and consider how far beyond the speed limit a defendant is driving before making a finding of recklessness. *See State v. Amurri*, 51 Wn. App. 262, 267, 753 P.2d 540 (1988) (holding evidence that driver exceeded speed limit while passing vehicle on the right, on wet, narrow, gravel shoulder was prima facie evidence of reckless operation of motor vehicle); *State v. Randhawa*, 133 Wn.2d 67, 78, 941 P.2d 661 (1997) (holding that a finding of reckless driving cannot always be inferred from evidence of exceeding a speed limit alone, the court must consider how far beyond the speed limit the defendant drove).

Here, the State offered the testimony of Officers Walsh and Waddell to support the eluding charge. First, the officers attempted to initiate a traffic stop. After initially stopping, the van drove off. Both officers followed the van with their lights and sirens on. Officer Walsh testified that there was light to medium traffic during the pursuit and some ice on the road. Officer Waddell testified that the first time Oya stopped, he did not pull over but stopped in the middle of a one-way street. Officer Walsh also estimated that Oya exceeded a 35 MPH speed limit and drove 70 to 75 MPH during the pursuit before stopping. And Officer Waddell testified that Oya did not stop to let George exit the van, but only slowed to 15 to 20 MPH such that George rolled on the ground after he leaped from the van.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that Oya drove in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences, establishing the essential element of reckless driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

D. ENDANGERMENT ENHANCEMENT

Oya next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a sentencing enhancement based on endangerment to George during the eluding. Again, we disagree.

The special allegation of endangerment by eluding a police vehicle applies when “sufficient admissible evidence exists, to show that one or more persons other than the defendant or the pursuing law enforcement officer were threatened with physical injury or harm by the actions of the person committing the crime of attempting to elude a police vehicle.” RCW 9.94A.834(1).

Here, both officers followed the van with their lights and sirens on. Officer Waddell drew his gun the first time he stopped Oya while George was still in the van. He kept the gun at “low ready,” meaning it was pointed off to his side at the ground. 4 RP at 426. The van drove off again.

While the van was moving at 15 to 20 MPH, George leaped out and tried to land on his feet but was going too fast so he rolled on the ground. Oya's actions in refusing to stop for pursuing police vehicles, as just described, jeopardized the safety of George. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the endangerment enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.

II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE NOT VIOLATED

Oya argues that his confrontation clause right was violated by the admission of George's statement. Oya further argues that he was prejudiced by the admission of George's statements because the statements inferred that he had a guilty state of mind with respect to all three charges. We find that even if Oya's confrontation clause rights were violated, the error was harmless.

Alleged confrontation clause violations are subject to the constitutional harmless error test. *State v. Vincent*, 131 Wn. App. 147, 154-55, 120 P.3d 120 (2005). "A confrontation clause error is harmless if the evidence is overwhelming and the violation so insignificant by comparison that we are persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the violation did not affect the verdict." *Vincent*, 131 Wn. App. at 154-55. "Considerations include the importance of the witness's testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case." *Vincent*, 131 Wn. App. at 155.

Here, even assuming a violation of Oya's right of confrontation, under these circumstances any error is harmless. Here, George said that "[Oya], basically, knew that the police were behind him because he said something to the effect that he knew that he was going to get stopped." 4 RP

at 412. The State asked if George gave a reason why he jumped from the car, and Officer Waddell replied, "He jumped from the car because he didn't want to be involved. He didn't realize that Mr. Oya was wanted by police or anything like that." 4 RP at 412. As Oya argues, these statements by George may have further implicated a guilty conscience to Oya about the events related to the assault and the hit and run charges and could have been used to show that he knowingly attempted to elude the police on February 7.

But as discussed above, strong evidence supported the eluding and the hit and run charges such that this testimony was not important to the State's case. *Vincent*, 131 Wn. App. at 154-55. George's testimony was likely cumulative evidence of Oya's guilty conscience regarding the hit and run and assault charges given that the State introduced the testimony of several witnesses that Boyd had apparent injuries and Oya fled the scene on February 4 without rendering her reasonable aid. And George's testimony was not necessary to show that Oya knowingly eluded police: Oya was followed by two patrol cars with their sirens and emergency lights on; at one point he looked back and saw the officers, stopped, but then continued to drive. Oya contests only that he drove recklessly, and George's statements do not speak to the nature of Oya's driving.

We conclude that any confrontation clause error was harmless because the untainted evidence was overwhelming and the violation so insignificant by comparison that we are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Oya would have been convicted of the eluding and hit and run charges without the admission of George's statements.

III. COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE

Oya briefly argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to George's testimony on the basis of Oya's confrontation clause rights because the trial court would have

sustained the objection. Because Oya cannot show that he was prejudiced, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In *Strickland*, the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-prong inquiry for reversal of a criminal conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 466 U.S. at 687. Under the *Strickland* test, the defendant bears the burden to show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the attorney's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687. Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 700.

Prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. *State v. McFarland*, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).

As discussed above, even if the admission of George's statements violated Oya's confrontation rights, the State had other strong evidence to support both of his convictions and, thus, there is no reasonable probability that, except for counsel's failing to object on confrontation grounds, the result of the proceeding would have been different. *McFarland*, 127 Wn.2d at 335. Thus, Oya has not shown prejudice from his counsel's performance. *McFarland*, 127 Wn.2d at 335. We conclude that Oya's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

IV. SEVERANCE

Oya argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motions to sever the assault and the hit and run charges from the eluding charge such that reversal and remand for a new trial is required. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES OF LAW

We reverse a trial court's refusal to sever counts only for a manifest abuse of discretion. *State v. Russell*, 125 Wn.2d 24, 63, 882 P.2d 747 (1994). A trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on untenable or unreasonable grounds. *State v. Thang*, 145 Wn.2d 630, 642, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002).

CrR 4.3 permits a court to join two or more offenses in a charging document when the offenses are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan. CrR 4.3(a)(2). The court rules mandate that properly joined offenses shall be consolidated for trial unless the court orders severance under the applicable rule. CrR 4.3.1. CrR 4.4(b) directs the court to grant severance if it concludes that severance will promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense. Separate trials are disfavored in Washington. *State v. Emery*, 174 Wn.2d 741, 752, 278 P.3d 653 (2012).

In examining whether a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to sever offenses, our courts have recognized that joinder of offenses may prejudice a defendant in that ““(1) he may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate defenses; (2) the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes charged to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from which is found his guilt of the other crime or crimes charged; or (3) the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would

not so find.” *State v. Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d 713, 718, 790 P.2d 154 (1990) (quoting *State v. Smith*, 74 Wn.2d 744, 755, 446 P.2d 571 (1968), *vacated in part*, 408 U.S. 934, 92 S. Ct. 2852, 33 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1972), *overruled on other grounds by State v. Gosby*, 85 Wn.2d 758, 539 P.2d 680 (1975)). Oya bears the burden to establish a manifest, specific prejudice that outweighs a concern for judicial economy. *Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d at 718.

B. PREJUDICE AND MITIGATION

Four factors mitigate potential prejudice to the accused, none of which is dispositive. *State v. McDaniel*, 155 Wn. App. 829, 860, 230 P.3d 245 (2010). “In determining whether the potential for prejudice requires severance, a trial court must consider (1) the strength of the State’s evidence on each count; (2) the clarity of defenses as to each count; (3) court instructions to the jury to consider each count separately; and (4) the admissibility of evidence of the other charges even if not joined for trial.” *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 63.

1. STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE

Oya argues that the State’s case was not strong on any of the counts. We disagree.

We first review the relative strength of the State’s case for each count. *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 64. “When the State’s evidence is strong on each count, there is no necessity for the jury to base its finding of guilt on any one count on the strength of the evidence of another.” *Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d at 721-22. Thus, this factor mitigates the potential prejudice that the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes charged to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from which his guilt of the other crimes charged is found or that the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find. *See Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d at 721-22.

“[T]he elements of felony hit and run require proof of (1) death or injury to a person or damage to an attended vehicle, and (2) failure of the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident to stop his vehicle and return to the scene in order to provide his name, address, vehicle license number and driver’s license and to render reasonable assistance to any person injured in such accident.” *State v. Bourne*, 90 Wn. App. 963, 969, 954 P.2d 366 (1998).

The elements of the crime of attempting to elude a police vehicle are fixed in RCW 46.61.024(1) that states,

Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to immediately bring his or her vehicle to a stop and who drives his or her vehicle in a reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a class C felony. The signal given by the police officer may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving such a signal shall be in uniform and the vehicle shall be equipped with lights and sirens.

Driving “in a reckless manner means driving in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.” *State v. Roggenkamp*, 153 Wn.2d 614, 622, 106 P.3d 196 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Bowman*, 57 Wn.2d at 270, 271). Exceeding the speed limit is prima facie evidence of reckless operation of a motor vehicle. RCW 46.61.465. But exceeding the speed limit alone is not sufficient to find reckless driving. *See Randhawa*, 133 Wn.2d at 78 (holding a finding of reckless driving cannot always be inferred from evidence of speed).

Oya’s first allegation of prejudice is that because the State’s case was not strong on any counts, the “sensational nature” of the assault charge prejudiced the jury against Oya, presumably for both convictions though he does not specify. Br. of Appellant at 16. But the jury found Oya not guilty of the assault, so it is hard to see how the alleged “sensational nature” of the assault charge prejudiced Oya. Also, this general allegation of prejudice does not meet Oya’s burden to

show a manifest specific prejudice. Finally, even assuming a specific manifest prejudice, the strength of the State's case on each count for which he was convicted mitigated this prejudice.

The State's evidence for the hit and run charge was strong. Boyd ended up on the ground because she was hit by the van. Boyd's leg was injured and her injury seemed apparent since she could not get up on her own, was limping when helped up, and her leg was swollen. Oya did not get out of the van to render reasonable assistance to Boyd. Oya left without rendering aid.

The State's evidence for the eluding charge and the endangerment enhancement was also strong. There was no evidence that Oya violated any stop signs, swerved, lost control, sustained a high speed, or struck any property or persons. But Officer Walsh estimated that Oya exceeded a 35 MPH speed limit and drove 70 to 75 MPH during one portion of the pursuit, which lasted a half a mile to three-quarters of a mile in total. And although the officers' testimony conflicted as to whether Oya stopped or merely slowed to 15 to 20 MPH before George left the van, both officers agreed that George jumped from the van rather than stepping out.

Officer Waddell, who testified that the van did *not stop*, was driving the patrol car directly behind Oya's van, while Officer Walsh was behind Officer Waddell and so may not have seen the events as clearly. Finally, George told Officer Waddell that he jumped from the van because he did not want to "be involved," thus indicating Oya's actions forced him to leap from the van. 4 RP at 412. Exceeding the speed limit by 35 MPH, even in a short burst, and not stopping to allow a passenger to properly exit a vehicle but continuing to drive 15 to 20 MPH while he or she leaps out exhibits indifference to harm that George could have sustained and that Oya acted rashly during the eluding. We conclude that the strength of the State's case with respect to his convictions mitigates the weak prejudice asserted by Oya, thus this factor weighs against severance.

2. CLARITY OF DEFENSES

Oya argues that the clarity of defenses factor did not mitigate the prejudice he alleges because he was not able to testify in his own defense regarding the attempted eluding charge due to joinder. This argument fails.

The clarity of defenses factor requires review of whether the defendant's defenses to each count was prejudiced by joinder. *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 64. Prejudice may result where a defendant may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate defenses. *Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d at 718. For example, in *Cross v. United States*, the court vacated convictions of two defendants and remanded for new trials because it concluded that joinder of counts was prejudicial. 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The defendants in *Cross* did not specify at trial which counts they wished to remain silent on or why, but this apparently was because the trial court insisted that the issue of joinder had been determined finally in its denial of a pretrial motion to sever and refused to hear the defendants' arguments. 335 F.2d at 989-90. The Court of Appeals determined that the record showed that Cross offered convincing evidence for the count he was acquitted of, but was plainly evasive and unconvincing in his testimony on the count upon which he was convicted. *Cross*, 335 F.2d at 990. The court held,

Thus it would appear that Cross had ample reason not to testify on Count I and would not have done so if that count had been tried separately. In a separate trial of that count the jury would not have heard his admissions of prior convictions and unsavory activities; nor would he have been under duress to offer dubious testimony on that count in order to avoid the damaging implication of testifying on only one of the two joined counts. Since the joinder embarrassed and confounded Cross in making his defense, the joinder was prejudicial within the meaning of [Fed. R. Crim. P. 14].

Cross, 335 F.2d at 990-91. Subsequent decisions have clarified that a defendant's desire to testify only on one count requires severance only if a defendant makes a convincing showing that he has

important testimony to give concerning one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying about another. *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 65.

Here, Oya argues that he was prejudiced because he was unable to testify as to the eluding. But Oya's arguments do not establish that his desire to testify regarding only one count amounted to such prejudice that his defenses were unclear and severance was required.

a. IMPORTANT TESTIMONY REGARDING ELUDE COUNT NOT ESTABLISHED

First, Oya argues that his desire to testify regarding only the eluding charge requires severance because he had important testimony to give regarding the eluding to combat the State's subjective reckless driving evidence. Oya does not make a convincing showing that he had important testimony to give. Oya argued at trial that he had to testify about the eluding charge to get the lesser-included instruction of failure to obey a police officer and to challenge the enhancement. But Oya was given the lesser-included instruction despite not testifying.

His offer of proof at trial was that he would testify that (1) he did not intend to get away from the police and (2) he intended to park his van so that it would not get impounded because he was driving without a license. These offers of proof relate to his intent during the eluding, but even if the eluding charge was severed from the other charges, Oya would not have been permitted to testify about his reasons for eluding because such evidence is irrelevant.

Next, his offer of proof at trial was that he would have testified that he did not feel he was driving recklessly and did not put people in danger. But Oya's opinions and ultimate legal conclusions are also not admissible evidence. If Oya had offered that he intended to testify that he drove only the speed limit during the entire episode or eluded police because George had held a gun to his head in his van, *that* would be important testimony to give regarding the eluding—but

he offers no such factual showing here. His offer of proof fails to convincingly show that joinder prevented him from giving important testimony to defend against the eluding charge. This factor weighs against severance.

b. POTENTIAL EMBARRASSMENT

Next, Oya argues that he would be embarrassed if he had to testify about the assault and the hit and run. He states this is so because if he testified about eluding the police, that would likely open the door to testifying about the assault and hit and run, which would necessitate testifying about his “relationship with Ms. Boyd, her drug activities, the couple’s argument and the accident [that] would have been a messy, embarrassing proposition for Mr. Oya.” Br. of Appellant at 17. As in *Cross*, if Oya *had to* testify about the assault and the hit and run in order to testify about eluding, that could embarrass and confound Oya in making his defense that he did not drive recklessly for the reason he states, but the argument that Oya would *have to* testify about the assault and hit and run if he testified about eluding is premised on fallacy.

Oya wanted to testify regarding the eluding charge, in part, that he eluded the police because he did not want his car to be impounded. But a person’s *reason* for eluding the police is not an element of attempting to elude. See RCW 46.61.024(1). Oya’s proffered reason for eluding the police plainly seeks to negate any inference of a guilty conscience with respect to the assault and hit and run charges by replacing it with fear of having his van impounded. But severing the eluding charge from the hit and run as Oya requested would mean that the reason he was eluding police would not be admissible at all for the eluding charge because his reasons are not relevant to that charge. And if Oya merely testified about the nature of his driving on February 7—his speed

and observance of traffic laws—to show that he was not driving recklessly, that would not open the door to cross-examination about the assault and hit and run charges.

Oya has not shown that he was unable to testify. And we conclude that Oya has not shown his desire to testify only to the eluding charge amounts to prejudice requiring severance because he did not make a convincing showing that he had important testimony to give about the eluding or that he had a strong need to refrain from testifying about the assault and hit and run counts. *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 65. Accordingly, we conclude that the clarity of Oya’s defenses was not prejudiced by joinder as he asserts and this factor weighs against severance.

4. INSTRUCTIONS

Oya concedes that the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider each count separately, but he argues that it was insufficient to cure the prejudice from joinder as was the case in *State v. Harris*, 36 Wn. App. 746, 750, 677 P.2d 202 (1984). We disagree.

A court’s instructions to a jury to consider each count separately can mitigate potential prejudice resulting from joinder. *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 66. A jury is presumed to follow a court’s instructions. *State v. Lough*, 125 Wn.2d 847, 864, 889 P.2d 487 (1995). This is uncontested.

Oya argues that he was prejudiced because a “joint trial of these separate offenses created an improper impression that Mr. Oya has a ‘general propensity’ toward criminal acts,” thus presumably prejudicing him on both conviction charges. Br. of Appellant at 24. Relying on *Harris*, Oya argues that consolidation in a trial is “not all that different” in terms of the prejudice rendered when introducing a past offense and, thus, a short limiting instruction cannot mitigate the resulting prejudice. Br. of Appellant at 19. But *Harris* does not stand for that general of a proposition that consolidation is inherently prejudicial. Rather, *Harris* involved sexual offenses

where the court recognized the “great potential for prejudice inherent in evidence of prior sexual offenses” and held that despite a proper instruction to consider each count separately, prejudice could not be cured. *Harris*, 36 Wn. App. at 752. Here, the evidence of an assault and a hit and run in addition to an elude charge does not involve the inherently prejudicial effect of prior sexual offenses in a sex offense case.

The trial court’s instruction stated, “A separate crime is charged in each count. You must decide each count separately. Your verdict on one count should not control your verdict on any other count.” CP at 50. Oya now argues that this instruction is problematic because it contains no admonishment that evidence from one count cannot be used in determining the verdict on the other count or that jurors should not presume Oya to be a law breaker because he is accused of committing multiple crimes over multiple days. But Oya never proposed such an instruction. Because this instruction matches 11 WPIIC 3.01, at 80 (3d ed. 2008) for multiple counts/single defendant crimes, we find no error with respect to the instruction and conclude that the jury is presumed to have followed this proper instruction, mitigating Oya’s claimed prejudice of the jury believing that he has a general propensity towards crime. *Lough*, 125 Wn.2d at 864. Thus, this factor weighs against severance.

5. CROSS ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

Oya argues that the evidence from the charges was not cross admissible. We conclude that some evidence was cross admissible.

We review whether evidence of each count would be cross admissible to prove the other charges under ER 404(b) if severance were granted. *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 66. Evidence of other crimes or acts is inadmissible to prove character. ER 404(b). Such evidence may, however, be

admissible for other purposes such as intent or knowledge. ER 404(b). Admissibility of evidence under ER 404(b) requires a three-part analysis: the court must identify the purpose for which the evidence will be admitted, the evidence must be relevant to that purpose and of consequence to the outcome, and the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against any unfair prejudicial effect the evidence may have upon the fact-finder. ER 404(b).

a. EVIDENCE OF ELUDING WAS NOT CROSS ADMISSIBLE TO ESTABLISH IDENTITY

First, Oya argues that the evidence was not cross admissible to establish identity. We agree.

Evidence of other crimes is relevant on the issue of identity only if the method employed in the commission of both crimes is “so unique” that proof that an accused committed one of the crimes creates a high probability that he also committed the other crimes. *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 66-67. Here, Boyd identified Oya as the driver for the assault and hit and run charges. And Officer Walsh arrested Oya immediately after he exited the van following the attempted eluding, which establishes Oya’s identity for the enhancement as well. Thus, evidence of each charge was not relevant to identity because Oya’s identity was ascertainable from the evidence unique to each charge. *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 66-67.

b. EVIDENCE OF ELUDING WAS NOT CROSS ADMISSIBLE TO ESTABLISH WHY POLICE SOUGHT OUT OYA

Oya argues that evidence of the assault and the hit and run was not cross admissible to show why police were looking for Oya’s van the day of the eluding because knowing exactly why they were searching for the van is irrelevant to proving eluding. We agree.

Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be otherwise.

ER 401. The true test of admissibility is whether the other crimes' evidence is relevant and necessary to prove an essential ingredient of the crime charged. *State v. Weddel*, 29 Wn. App. 461, 466, 629 P.2d 912 (1981). The State could have elicited testimony from either Officer Walsh or Officer Waddell that the police were looking for the van simply because it was previously involved in a crime: *the reason* for police pursuit is not an "essential ingredient" for the crime of attempting to elude pursuing police. *Weddel*, 29 Wn. App. at 466. Thus, evidence of the hit and run and assault was not cross admissible for this reason advocated for by the State.

c. EVIDENCE OF FLIGHT IS CROSS ADMISSIBLE

Oya argues that evidence of the eluding charge was not cross admissible as evidence of flight to be used to infer consciousness of guilt with respect to the assault and hit and run charges. We disagree.

i. EVIDENCE OF ELUDING WAS PROBATIVE EVIDENCE OF FLIGHT RELEVANT TO THE OTHER CHARGES

Oya argues that evidence of eluding is not cross admissible as evidence of flight to show consciousness of guilt with respect to the assault and the hit and run charges. Again, we disagree.

"Evidence of flight is admissible if it creates 'a reasonable and substantive inference that defendant's departure from the scene was an instinctive or impulsive reaction to a consciousness of guilt or was a deliberate effort to evade arrest and prosecution.'" *State v. Freeburg*, 105 Wn. App. 492, 497, 20 P.3d 984 (2001) (quoting *State v. Nichols*, 5 Wn. App. 657, 660, 491 P.2d 677 (1971)). "When evidence of flight is admissible, it tends to be only marginally probative as to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence." *Freeburg*, 105 Wn. App. at 498. "Therefore, while the range of circumstances that may be shown as evidence of flight is broad, the circumstance or inference

No. 47136-1-II

of consciousness of guilt must be substantial and real, not speculative, conjectural, or fanciful.” *Freeburg*, 105 Wn. App. at 498.

Oya relies on *State v. Price*, 126 Wn. App. 617, 645, 109 P.3d 27 (2005), and *Freeburg* to argue that his conduct on February 7 was not evidence of flight because he did not leave Washington and because the inference of consciousness of guilt from the eluding is speculative, not substantial or real. First, neither *Price* nor *Freeburg* state that flight occurs only where a defendant leaves the State where the crime occurred. *Freeburg* says the opposite: it states actual flight is not required, but evidence of resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and related conduct are also admissible as evidence of flight. 105 Wn. App. at 497-98. Thus, Oya’s first argument fails.

Second, comparison of this case to *Price* and *Freeburg* demonstrates that the inference of consciousness of guilt of the assault and hit and run charges from the eluding charge is substantial and real, not speculative. In *Price*, this court found evidence was admissible that Price traveled outside of Washington shortly after a murder with a “backpack full of grooming supplies, medications, and hair trimmers” that he used to change his appearance. 126 Wn. App. at 645. The court concluded that this evidence was admissible because it was relevant to Price’s consciousness of guilt, because it supported a reasonable inference that he left the State to avoid arrest and prosecution. *Price*, 126 Wn. App. at 645. Similarly, here, Oya’s eluding of two patrol cars with their lights and sirens on for over half a mile just three days after the incident at the gas station allows for a reasonable, substantial, and real inference of consciousness of guilt of the charged crime.

In *Freeburg*, a defendant was arrested in Canada with a handgun in his boot two years after a murder. 105 Wn. App. at 500. The *Freeburg* court found that the gun was not admissible evidence of flight to show consciousness of guilt for the murder where the gun was not the one used in the murder and where the arrest occurred two years after the murder. 105 Wn. App. at 500. While it would have been speculative in *Freeburg* to infer Freeburg's consciousness of guilt of a murder from two years ago just because he was carrying a gun in another country, here it was not speculative to infer consciousness of guilt of the other charges from Oya's eluding. We thus conclude that Oya's eluding conduct on February 7 was at least marginally probative as evidence of flight to make a reasonable inference of Oya's consciousness of guilt for the assault and hit and run charges.

ii. PROBATIVE VALUE OF FLIGHT EVIDENCE IS NOT OUTWEIGHED BY PREJUDICE

Oya argues in essence that even if the eluding evidence was admissible as flight evidence, the admission of the eluding evidence to infer consciousness of guilt of the assault and hit and run charges was more prejudicial than probative. This argument fails.

Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be otherwise. ER 401. Relevant evidence may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. ER 403. We do not consider claims unsupported by legal authority or argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6); *Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley*, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

Oya argues that the cross admission of the eluding evidence was prejudicial with respect to the endangerment enhancement and to the assault and the hit and run charges because it invited

speculation that Oya “is the kind of person who uses a motor vehicle to hurt, or nearly hurt, others.” Br. of Appellant at 24. But Oya does not support his claim of prejudice with respect to the eluding and hit and run charges or the endangerment enhancement with any citation to the record or legal analysis. We decline to consider this argument further. *Coviche Canyon*, 118 Wn.2d at 809; RAP 10.3(a)(6).

We conclude that although the flight evidence of eluding may have had minor probative value regarding the hit and run case, Oya does not meet his burden to show that the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We conclude that evidence of the eluding was cross admissible to the hit and run and assault charges and, thus, this factor weighs against severance.

6. INTEREST IN JUDICIAL ECONOMY

Oya argues that two trials would not have strained judicial resources, but failure to sever was prejudicial. We reject this argument.


The court must “weigh any prejudice to the defendant resulting from joinder against the need for judicial economy.” *Russell*, 125 Wn.2d at 68. Foremost among the concern for judicial economy is the conservation of judicial resources and public funds. *Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d at 723. In examining whether a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to sever offenses, joinder may prejudice a defendant in that “the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find.” *Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d at 718 (quoting *Smith*, 74 Wn.2d at 755). When the issues are relatively simple and the trial lasts only a couple of days, the jury can be reasonably expected to compartmentalize the evidence and, under

these circumstances, “there may be no prejudicial effect from joinder even when the evidence would not have been admissible in separate trials.” *Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d at 721.


Here, testimony for this case occurred over two days. Given that short period of time and that the issues were relatively simple, the jury can be reasonably expected to have compartmentalized the evidence. *Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d at 721. Two trials would require two courtrooms and sets of jurors as well as double the expenditure of time for voir dire, weighing against severance. And as analyzed above, all four of the factors tend to mitigate the prejudices alleged by Oya from joinder. Finally, although Oya makes several general arguments related to prejudice, he does not establish a manifest, specific prejudice that outweighs a concern for judicial economy. *Bythrow*, 114 Wn.2d at 718. Thus, we conclude that the minimal prejudice to Oya resulting from joinder did not outweigh considerations of judicial economy.


We affirm Oya’s convictions and sentence.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.


JOHANSON, J.

We concur:


BINGER, C.J.


MAXA, J.

DECLARATION OF FILING AND MAILING OR DELIVERY

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on the below date, the original document **Petition for Review to the Supreme Court** to which this declaration is affixed/attached, was filed in the **Court of Appeals** under **Case No. 47136-1-II**, and a true copy was mailed with first-class postage prepaid or otherwise caused to be delivered to the following attorney(s) or party/parties of record at their regular office / residence / e-mail address as listed on ACORDS / WSBA website:

- respondent Brent Hyer, DPA
[PCpatcecf@co.pierce.wa.us]
Pierce County Prosecutor's Office
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MARIA ANA ARRANZA RILEY, Legal Assistant
Washington Appellate Project

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